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The Summer of 1787 takes us into the sweltering room in which the founding fathers struggled for four months to produce the Constitution: the flawed but enduring document that would define the nation—then and now.George Washington presided, James Madison kept the notes, Benjamin Franklin offered wisdom and humor at crucial times. The Summer of 1787 traces the struggles within the Philadelphia Convention as the delegates hammered out the charter for the world’s first constitutional democracy. Relying on the words of the delegates themselves to explore the Convention’s sharp conflicts and hard bargaining, David O. Stewart lays out the passions and contradictions of the, often, painful process of writing the Constitution. It was a desperate balancing act. Revolutionary principles required that the people have power, but could the people be trusted? Would a stronger central government leave room for the states? Would the small states accept a Congress in which seats were allotted according to population rather than to each sovereign state? And what of slavery? The supercharged debates over America’s original sin led to the most creative and most disappointing political deals of the Convention. The room was crowded with colorful and passionate characters, some known—Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, Edmund Randolph—and others largely forgotten. At different points during that sultry summer, more than half of the delegates threatened to walk out, and some actually did, but Washington’s quiet leadership and the delegates’ inspired compromises held the Convention together. In a country continually arguing over the document’s original intent, it is fascinating to watch these powerful characters struggle toward consensus—often reluctantly—to write a flawed but living and breathing document that could evolve with the nation.
This book is very well researched and very well written. The author neither glorifies the framers nor disparages them. Rather, he mostly lets the facts speak for themselves. Among those facts were the compromises over slavery, including the three-fifths compromise in which a slave (who could not vote) was to be counted as three-fifths of a white person for purposes of apportioning the numbers of Representatives allotted to each state in the House of Representatives. The effects of the three-fifths clause also carried over into the election of the President, since the number of electors for each state in the electoral college was based on the total number of that state's Representatives and Senators. Indeed, one of the reasons for the electoral college was that it would incorporate the three-fifths ratio. A direct popular vote for president, which was supported by James Wilson, James Madison, and a few other delegates, would not have given the South that extra boost in selecting the president.David O. Stewart observes that some sort of compromise over slavery was necessary if a union of all the states was to be formed. However, in the last chapter of his book (pages 261-62), Stewart delineates some of the historical consequences of the compromises embedded in the original Constitution:"Most obviously, preservation of the slave trade meant the continued importation of many thousands of Africans in chains. The Fugitive Slave Clause gave slave owners a critical tool for enforcing their dominion over the people they held in bondage."Though less obvious in its impact, the three-fifths ratio rankled for decades. By granting additional representation based on slaves, that clause enhanced southern power, as reflected in many measures:"• Ten of the first fifteen presidents were slave owners."• John Adams would have won a second term as president but for twelve electoral votes cast for Jefferson (and Burr) that represented southern slaves (counted at three-fifths of their real number)."• For twenty-seven of the nation’s first thirty-five years, southerners sat as Speaker of the House of Representatives."• Nineteen of the first thirty-four Supreme Court justices were slaveholders."Because of the three-fifths ratio, Virginia in the 1790s had six more congressmen than did Pennsylvania even though both states had roughly the same number of free inhabitants. The three-fifths ratio gave slave states fourteen extra seats in the House in 1793, twenty-seven additional seats in 1812, and twenty-five added seats in 1833."Those extra votes meant that when crises erupted over slavery in 1820, in 1850, and in 1856, slave owners in positions of power ensured that the political system did not challenge human bondage. House seats created by the three-fifths rule allowed Missouri to be admitted as a slave state in 1820, and ensured enactment of the 1840 gag rule that choked off antislavery petitions to Congress."Stewart explains that "[h]istorians disagree over the terrible bargains that the Convention struck over slavery. Some insist that the delegates did the best they could under the circumstances." However, "[o]thers counter that the northern delegates caved in too easily to implausible southern threats to abandon the Union." Specifically, Georgia and South Carolina, the states that most demanded concessions to slavery, probably could not have survived outside the union as result of their respective dire circumstances. The author concludes that "[f]or all they have been celebrated, the delegates bear responsibility for having entrenched slavery ever deeper, for not even beginning to express disapproval of it." Ibid., 262-63.But Stewart is careful in his examination of the history of the Constitutional Convention. He observes, in more than one place, that the New England states, which benefited economically from the slave trade due to their shipping interests, were more than willing to accommodate Georgia and South Carolina on slavery. Strangely, it was James Madison and George Mason, both slaveholding Virginians, who had the most compunctions about slavery. Although Thomas Jefferson, another slaveholding Virginian, was also on record against this practice, he did not attend the Convention because he was representing the United States in Paris at the time. But although Madison, Mason, and Jefferson were conflicted about slavery, they never (with a few exceptions) actually freed their own slaves. That was the legacy of another Virginian, George Washington, whose Will contained provisions that led to the emancipation of his slaves within two years after his death. Washington was the presiding officer of the Convention. Although he spoke little, he was respected by virtually all of the other delegates.I strongly recommend this book.